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In the generative tradition, the language faculty has been shrinking—perhaps to include
only the mechanism of recursion. This paper argues that even this view of the language
faculty is too expansive. We first argue that a language faculty is difficult to reconcile with
evolutionary considerations. We then focus on recursion as a detailed case study, arguing
that our ability to process recursive structure does not rely on recursion as a property
of the grammar, but instead emerges gradually by piggybacking on domain-general
sequence learning abilities. Evidence from genetics, comparative work on non-human
primates, and cognitive neuroscience suggests that humans have evolved complex
sequence learning skills, which were subsequently pressed into service to accommodate
language. Constraints on sequence learning therefore have played an important role
in shaping the cultural evolution of linguistic structure, including our limited abilities for
processing recursive structure. Finally, we re-evaluate some of the key considerations
that have often been taken to require the postulation of a language faculty.
Keywords: recursion, language evolution, cultural evolution, usage-based processing, language faculty,
domain-general processes, sequence learning
Introduction
Over recent decades, the language faculty has been getting smaller. In its heyday, it was presumed to
encode a detailed “universal grammar,” sufficiently complex that the process of language acquisition
could be thought of as analogous to processes of genetically controlled growth (e.g., of a lung, or
chicken’s wing) and thus that language acquisition should not properly be viewed as a matter of
learning at all. Of course, the child has to home in on the language being spoken in its linguistic
environment, but this was seen as a matter of setting a finite set of discrete parameters to the correct
values for the target language—but the putative bauplan governing all human languages was viewed
as innately specified. Within the generative tradition, the advent of minimalism (Chomsky, 1995)
led to a severe theoretical retrenchment. Apparently baroque innately specified complexities of
language, such as those captured in the previous Principles and Parameters framework (Chomsky,
1981), were seen as emerging from more fundamental language-specific constraints. Quite what
these constraints are has not been entirely clear, but an influential article (Hauser et al., 2002)
raised the possibility that the language faculty, strictly defined (i.e., not emerging from general-
purpose cognitive mechanisms or constraints) might be very small indeed, comprising, perhaps,
just the mechanism of recursion (see also, Chomsky, 2010). Here, we follow this line of thinking
to its natural conclusion, and argue that the language faculty is, quite literally, empty: that natural
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language emerges from general cognitive constraints, and
that there is no innately specified special-purpose cognitive
machinery devoted to language (though there may have been
some adaptations for speech; e.g., Lieberman, 1984).
The structure of this paper is as follows. In The Evolutionary
Implausibility of an Innate Language Faculty, we question
whether an innate linguistic endowment could have arisen
through biological evolution. In Sequence Learning ad the Basis
for Recursive Structure, we then focus on what is, perhaps, the last
bastion for defenders of the language faculty: natural language
recursion. We argue that our limited ability to deal with recursive
structure in natural language is an acquired skill, relying on non-
linguistic abilities for sequence learning. Finally, in Language
without a Language Faculty, we use these considerations as a basis
for reconsidering some influential lines of argument for an innate
language faculty1.
The Evolutionary Implausibility of an Innate
Language Faculty
Advocates of a rich, innate language faculty have often pointed
to analogies between language and vision (e.g., Fodor, 1983;
Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Pinker, 1994). Both appear to pose
highly specific processing challenges, which seem distinct from
those involved in more general learning, reasoning, and decision
making processes. There is strong evidence that the brain
has innately specified neural hardwiring for visual processing;
so, perhaps we should expect similar dedicated machinery for
language processing.
Yet on closer analysis, the parallel with vision seems to lead
to a very different conclusion. The structure of the visual world
(e.g., in terms of its natural statistics, e.g., Field, 1987; and
the ecological structure generated by the physical properties
of the world and the principles of optics, e.g., Gibson, 1979;
Richards, 1988) has been fairly stable over the tens of millions
of years over which the visual system has developed in the
primate lineage. Thus, the forces of biological evolution have
been able to apply a steady pressure to develop highly specialized
visual processing machinery, over a very long time period. But
any parallel process of adaptation to the linguistic environment
would have operated on a timescale shorter by two orders of
magnitude: language is typically assumed to have arisen in the last
100,000–200,000 years (e.g., Bickerton, 2003). Moreover, while
the visual environment is stable, the linguistic environment is
anything but stable. Indeed, during historical time, language
change is consistently observed to be extremely rapid—indeed,
the entire Indo-European language group may have a common
root just 10,000 years ago (Gray and Atkinson, 2003).
Yet this implies that the linguistic environment is a fast-
changing “moving target” for biological adaptation, in contrast to
the stability of the visual environment. Can biological evolution
occur under these conditions? One possibility is that there
1Although we do not discuss sign languages explicitly in this article, we believe
that they are subject to the same arguments as we here present for spoken
language. Thus, our arguments are intended to apply to language in general,
independently of the modality within which it is expressed (see Christiansen and
Chater, Forthcoming 2016, in press, for further discussion).
might be co-evolution between language and the genetically-
specified language faculty (e.g., Pinker and Bloom, 1990). But
computer simulations have shown that co-evolution between
slowly changing “language genes” and more a rapidly change
language environment does not occur. Instead, the language
rapidly adapts, through cultural evolution, to the existing “pool”
of language genes (Chater et al., 2009). More generally, in gene-
culture interactions, fast-changing culture rapidly adapts to the
slower-changing genes and not vice versa (Baronchelli et al.,
2013a).
It might be objected that not all aspects of the linguistic
environment may be unstable—indeed, advocates of an innate
language faculty frequently advocate the existence of strong
regularities that they take to be universal across human languages
(Chomsky, 1980; though see Evans and Levinson, 2009). Such
universal features of human language would, perhaps, be stable
features of the linguistic environment, and hence provide a
possible basis for biological adaptation. But this proposal involves
a circularity—because one of the reasons to postulate an innate
language faculty is to explain putative language universals: thus,
such universals cannot be assumed to pre-exist, and hence to
provide a stable environment for, the evolution of the language
faculty (Christiansen and Chater, 2008).
Yet perhaps a putative language faculty need not be a product
of biological adaptation at all—could it perhaps have arisen
through exaptation (Gould and Vrba, 1982): that is, as a side-
effect of other biological mechanisms, which have themselves
adapted to entirely different functions (e.g., Gould, 1993)? That a
rich innate language faculty (e.g., one embodying the complexity
of a theory such as Principles and Parameters) might arise as a
distinct and autonomous mechanism by, in essence, pure chance
seems remote (Christiansen and Chater, 2008). Without the
selective pressures driving adaptation, it is highly implausible that
new and autonomous piece of cognitive machinery (which, in
traditional formulations, the language faculty is typically assumed
to be, e.g., Chomsky, 1980; Fodor, 1983) might arise from
the chance recombination of pre-existing cognitive components
(Dediu and Christiansen, in press).
These arguments do not necessarily count against a very
minimal notion of the language faculty, however. As we have
noted, Hauser et al. (2002) speculate that the language faculty
may consist of nothing more than a mechanism for recursion.
Such a simple (though potentially far-reaching) mechanism
could, perhaps, have arisen as a consequence of a modest genetic
mutation (Chomsky, 2010). We shall argue, though, that even
this minimal conception of the contents of the language faculty
is too expansive. Instead, the recursive character of aspects of
natural language need not be explained by the operation of a
dedicated recursive processing mechanism at all, but, rather, as
emerging from domain-general sequence learning abilities.
Sequence Learning as the Basis for
Recursive Structure
Although recursion has always figured in discussions of the
evolution of language (e.g., Premack, 1985; Chomsky, 1988;
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Pinker and Bloom, 1990; Corballis, 1992; Christiansen, 1994),
the new millennium saw a resurgence of interest in the topic
following the publication of Hauser et al. (2002), controversially
claiming that recursion may be the only aspect of the language
faculty unique to humans. The subsequent outpouring of writings
has covered a wide range of topics, from criticisms of the Hauser
et al. claim (e.g., Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005; Parker, 2006) and
how to characterize recursion appropriately (e.g., Tomalin, 2011;
Lobina, 2014), to its potential presence (e.g., Gentner et al., 2006)
or absence in animals (e.g., Corballis, 2007), and its purported
universality in human language (e.g., Everett, 2005; Evans and
Levinson, 2009; Mithun, 2010) and cognition (e.g., Corballis,
2011; Vicari and Adenzato, 2014). Our focus here, however, is to
advocate a usage-based perspective on the processing of recursive
structure, suggesting that it relies on evolutionarily older abilities
for dealing with temporally presented sequential input.
Recursion in Natural Language: What Needs to
Be Explained?
The starting point for our approach to recursion in natural
language is that what needs to be explained is the observable
human ability to process recursive structure, and not recursion
as a hypothesized part of some grammar formalism. In this
context, it is useful to distinguish between two types of recursive
structures: tail recursive structures (such as 1) and complex
recursive structures (such as 2).
(1) The mouse bit the cat that chased the dog that ran away.
(2) The dog that the cat that the mouse bit chased ran away.
Both sentences in (1) and (2) express roughly the same
semantic content. However, whereas the two levels of tail
recursive structure in (1) do not cause much difficulty for
comprehension, the comparable sentence in (2) with two center-
embeddings cannot be readily understood. Indeed, there is
a substantial literature showing that English doubly center-
embedded sentences (such as 2) are read with the same
intonation as a list of random words (Miller, 1962), cannot
easily be memorized (Miller and Isard, 1964; Foss and Cairns,
1970), are difficult to paraphrase (Hakes and Foss, 1970; Larkin
and Burns, 1977) and comprehend (Wang, 1970; Hamilton
and Deese, 1971; Blaubergs and Braine, 1974; Hakes et al.,
1976), and are judged to be ungrammatical (Marks, 1968). Even
when facilitating the processing of center-embeddings by adding
semantic biases or providing training, only little improvement
is seen in performance (Stolz, 1967; Powell and Peters, 1973;
Blaubergs and Braine, 1974). Importantly, the limitations on
processing center-embeddings are not confined to English.
Similar patterns have been found in a variety of languages,
ranging from French (Peterfalvi and Locatelli, 1971), German
(Bach et al., 1986), and Spanish (Hoover, 1992) to Hebrew
(Schlesinger, 1975), Japanese (Uehara and Bradley, 1996), and
Korean (Hagstrom and Rhee, 1997). Indeed, corpus analyses of
Danish, English, Finnish, French, German, Latin, and Swedish
(Karlsson, 2007) indicate that doubly center-embedded sentences
are almost entirely absent from spoken language.
By making complex recursion a built-in property of grammar,
the proponents of such linguistic representations are faced with
a fundamental problem: the grammars generate sentences that
can never be understood and that would never be produced. The
standard solution is to propose a distinction between an infinite
linguistic competence and a limited observable psycholinguistic
performance (e.g., Chomsky, 1965). The latter is limited by
memory limitations, attention span, lack of concentration, and
other processing constraints, whereas the former is construed
to be essentially infinite in virtue of the recursive nature of
grammar. There are a number of methodological and theoretical
issues with the competence/performance distinction (e.g., Reich,
1969; Pylyshyn, 1973; Christiansen, 1992; Petersson, 2005;
see also Christiansen and Chater, Forthcoming 2016). Here,
however, we focus on a substantial challenge to the standard
solution, deriving from the considerable variation across
languages and individuals in the use of recursive structures—
differences that cannot readily be ascribed to performance
factors.
In a recent review of the pervasive differences that can
be observed throughout all levels of linguistic representations
across the world’s current 6–8000 languages, Evans and Levinson
(2009) observe that recursion is not a feature of every language.
Using examples from Central Alaskan Yup’ik Eskimo, Khalkha
Mongolian, and Mohawk, Mithun (2010) further notes that
recursive structures are far from uniform across languages, nor
are they static within individual languages. Hawkins (1994)
observed substantial oﬄine differences in perceived processing
difficulty of the same type of recursive constructions across
English, German, Japanese, and Persian. Moreover, a self-
paced reading study involving center-embedded sentences found
differential processing difficulties in Spanish and English (even
when morphological cues were removed in Spanish; Hoover,
1992). We see these cross-linguistic patterns as suggesting
that recursive constructions form part of a linguistic system:
the processing difficulty associated with specific recursive
constructions (and whether they are present at all) will be
determined by the overall distributional structure of the language
(including pragmatic and semantic considerations).
Considerable variations in recursive abilities have also
been observed developmentally. Dickinson (1987) showed that
recursive language production abilities emerge gradually, in
a piecemeal fashion. On the comprehension side, training
improves comprehension of singly embedded relative clause
constructions both in 3–4-year old children (Roth, 1984) and
adults (Wells et al., 2009), independent of other cognitive
factors. Level of education further correlates with the ability to
comprehend complex recursive sentences (Da˛browska, 1997).
More generally, these developmental differences are likely to
reflect individual variations in experience with language (see
Christiansen and Chater, Forthcoming 2016), differences that
may further be amplified by variations in the structural and
distributional characteristics of the language being spoken.
Together, these individual, developmental and cross-linguistic
differences in dealing with recursive linguistic structure cannot
easily be explained in terms of a fundamental recursive
competence, constrained by fixed biological constraints on
performance. That is, the variation in recursive abilities across
individuals, development, and languages are hard to explain
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in terms of performance factors, such as language-independent
constraints on memory, processing or attention, imposing
limitations on an otherwise infinite recursive grammar. Invoking
such limitations would require different biological constraints
on working memory, processing, or attention for speakers of
different languages, which seems highly unlikely. To resolve these
issues, we need to separate claims about recursive mechanisms
from claims about recursive structure: the ability to deal with
a limited amount of recursive structure in language does not
necessitate the postulation of recursive mechanisms to process
them. Thus, instead of treating recursion as an a priori property
of the language faculty, we need to provide a mechanistic account
able to accommodate the actual degree of recursive structure
found across both natural languages and natural language users:
no more and no less.
We favor an account of the processing of recursive
structure that builds on construction grammar and usage-
based approaches to language. The essential idea is that the
ability to process recursive structure does not depend on a
built-in property of a competence grammar but, rather, is
an acquired skill, learned through experience with specific
instances of recursive constructions and limited generalizations
over these (Christiansen and MacDonald, 2009). Performance
limitations emerge naturally through interactions between
linguistic experience and cognitive constraints on learning and
processing, ensuring that recursive abilities degrade in line with
human performance across languages and individuals. We show
how our usage-based account of recursion can accommodate
human data on the most complex recursive structures that have
been found in naturally occurring language: center-embeddings
and cross-dependencies. Moreover, we suggest that the human
ability to process recursive structures may have evolved on top
of our broader abilities for complex sequence learning. Hence,
we argue that language processing, implemented by domain-
general mechanisms—not recursive grammars—is what endows
language with its hallmark productivity, allowing it to “... make
infinite employment of finite means,” as the celebrated German
linguist, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1836/1999: p. 91), noted more
than a century and a half ago.
Comparative, Genetic, and Neural Connections
between Sequence Learning and Language
Language processing involves extracting regularities from highly
complex sequentially organized input, suggesting a connection
between general sequence learning (e.g., planning, motor control,
etc., Lashley, 1951) and language: both involve the extraction
and further processing of discrete elements occurring in
temporal sequences (see also e.g., Greenfield, 1991; Conway and
Christiansen, 2001; Bybee, 2002; de Vries et al., 2011, for similar
perspectives). Indeed, there is comparative, genetic, and neural
evidence suggesting that humans may have evolved specific
abilities for dealing with complex sequences. Experiments with
non-human primates have shown that they can learn both
fixed sequences, akin to a phone number (e.g., Heimbauer
et al., 2012), and probabilistic sequences, similar to “statistical
learning” in human studies (e.g., Heimbauer et al., 2010,
under review; Wilson et al., 2013). However, regarding complex
recursive non-linguistic sequences, non-human primates appear
to have significant limitations relative to human children (e.g., in
recursively sequencing actions to nest cups within one another;
Greenfield et al., 1972; Johnson-Pynn et al., 1999). Although
more carefully controlled comparisons between the sequence
learning abilities of human and non-primates are needed (see
Conway and Christiansen, 2001, for a review), the currently
available data suggest that humans may have evolved a superior
ability to deal with sequences involving complex recursive
structures.
The current knowledge regarding the FOXP2 gene is
consistent with the suggestion of a human adaptation for
sequence learning (for a review, see Fisher and Scharff, 2009).
FOXP2 is highly conserved across species but two amino acid
changes have occurred after the split between humans and
chimps, and these became fixed in the human population about
200,000 years ago (Enard et al., 2002). In humans, mutations to
FOXP2 result in severe speech and orofacial motor impairments
(Lai et al., 2001; MacDermot et al., 2005). Studies of FOXP2
expression in mice and imaging studies of an extended family
pedigree with FOXP2 mutations have provided evidence that
this gene is important to neural development and function,
including of the cortico-striatal system (Lai et al., 2003). When a
humanized version of Foxp2 was inserted into mice, it was found
to specifically affect cortico-basal ganglia circuits (including
the striatum), increasing dendrite length and synaptic plasticity
(Reimers-Kipping et al., 2011). Indeed, synaptic plasticity in
these circuits appears to be key to learning action sequences
(Jin and Costa, 2010); and, importantly, the cortico-basal ganglia
system has been shown to be important for sequence (and other
types of procedural) learning (Packard and Knowlton, 2002).
Crucially, preliminary findings from a mother and daughter pair
with a translocation involving FOXP2 indicate that they have
problems with both language and sequence learning (Tomblin
et al., 2004). Finally, we note that sequencing deficits also appear
to be associated with specific language impairment (SLI) more
generally (e.g., Tomblin et al., 2007; Lum et al., 2012; Hsu et al.,
2014; see Lum et al., 2014, for a review).
Hence, both comparative and genetic evidence suggests that
humans have evolved complex sequence learning abilities, which,
in turn, appear to have been pressed into service to support
the emergence of our linguistic skills. This evolutionary scenario
would predict that language and sequence learning should
have considerable overlap in terms of their neural bases. This
prediction is substantiated by a growing bulk of research in
the cognitive neurosciences, highlighting the close relationship
between sequence learning and language (see Ullman, 2004;
Conway and Pisoni, 2008, for reviews). For example, violations
of learned sequences elicit the same characteristic event-related
potential (ERP) brainwave response as ungrammatical sentences,
and with the same topographical scalp distribution (Christiansen
et al., 2012). Similar ERP results have been observed for musical
sequences (Patel et al., 1998). Additional evidence for a common
domain-general neural substrate for sequence learning and
language comes from functional imaging (fMRI) studies showing
that sequence violations activate Broca’s area (Lieberman et al.,
2004; Petersson et al., 2004, 2012; Forkstam et al., 2006), a
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region in the left inferior frontal gyrus forming a key part of the
cortico-basal ganglia network involved in language. Results from
a magnetoencephalography (MEG) experiment further suggest
that Broca’s area plays a crucial role in the processing of musical
sequences (Maess et al., 2001).
If language is subserved by the same neural mechanisms as
used for sequence processing, then we would expect a breakdown
of syntactic processing to be associated with impaired sequencing
abilities. Christiansen et al. (2010b) tested this prediction in a
population of agrammatic aphasics, who have severe problems
with natural language syntax in both comprehension and
production due to lesions involving Broca’s area (e.g., Goodglass
and Kaplan, 1983; Goodglass, 1993—see Novick et al., 2005;
Martin, 2006, for reviews). They confirmed that agrammatism
was associated with a deficit in sequence learning in the
absence of other cognitive impairments. Similar impairments
to the processing of musical sequences by the same population
were observed in a study by Patel et al. (2008). Moreover,
success in sequence learning is predicted by white matter
density in Broca’s area, as revealed by diffusion tensor magnetic
resonance imaging (Flöel et al., 2009). Importantly, applying
transcranial direct current stimulation (de Vries et al., 2010)
or repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (Uddén et al.,
2008) to Broca’s area during sequence learning or testing
improves performance. Together, these cognitive neuroscience
studies point to considerable overlap in the neural mechanisms
involved in language and sequence learning2, as predicted by
our evolutionary account (see also Wilkins and Wakefield, 1995;
Christiansen et al., 2002; Hoen et al., 2003; Ullman, 2004; Conway
and Pisoni, 2008, for similar perspectives).
Cultural Evolution of Recursive Structures Based
on Sequence Learning
Comparative and genetic evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis that humans have evolved more complex sequence
learning mechanisms, whose neural substrates subsequently were
recruited for language. But how might recursive structure recruit
such complex sequence learning abilities? Reali and Christiansen
(2009) explored this question using simple recurrent networks
(SRNs; Elman, 1990). The SRN is a type of connectionist model
that implements a domain-general learner with sensitivity to
complex sequential structure in the input. This model is trained
to predict the next element in a sequence and learns in a
self-supervised manner to correct any violations of its own
expectations regarding what should come next. The SRN model
has been successfully applied to the modeling of both sequence
learning (e.g., Servan-Schreiber et al., 1991; Botvinick and Plaut,
2004) and language processing (e.g., Elman, 1993), including
multiple-cue integration in speech segmentation (Christiansen
et al., 1998) and syntax acquisition (Christiansen et al., 2010a). To
2Some studies purportedly indicate that the mechanisms involved in syntactic
language processing are not the same as those involved in most sequence learning
tasks (e.g., Penã et al., 2002; Musso et al., 2003; Friederici et al., 2006). However, the
methods and arguments used in these studies have subsequently been challenged
(de Vries et al., 2008; Marcus et al., 2003, and Onnis et al., 2005, respectively),
thereby undermining their negative conclusions. Overall, the preponderance of the
evidence suggests that sequence-learning tasks tap into the mechanisms involved
in language acquisition and processing (see Petersson et al., 2012, for discussion).
model the difference in sequence learning skills between humans
and non-human primates, Reali and Christiansen first “evolved”
a group of networks to improve their performance on a sequence-
learning task in which they had to predict the next digit in a
five-digit sequence generated by randomizing the order of the
digits, 1–5 (based on a human task developed by Lee, 1997). At
each generation, the best performing network was selected, and
its initial weights (prior to any training)—i.e., their “genome”—
was slightly altered to produce a new generation of networks.
After 500 generations of this simulated “biological” evolution, the
resulting networks performed significantly better than the first
generation SRNs.
Reali and Christiansen (2009) then introduced language into
the simulations. Each miniature language was generated by
a context-free grammar derived from the grammar skeleton
in Table 1. This grammar skeleton incorporated substantial
flexibility in word order insofar as the material on the right-hand
side of each rule could be ordered as it is (right-branching), in the
reverse order (left-branching), or have a flexible order (i.e., the
constituent order is as is half of time, and the reverse the other
half of the time). Using this grammar skeleton, it is possible to
instantiate 36 (= 729) distinct grammars, with differing degrees
of consistency in the ordering of sentence constituents. Reali and
Christiansen implemented both biological and cultural evolution
in their simulations: As with the evolution of better sequence
learners, the initial weights of the network that best acquired a
language in a given generation were slightly altered to produce
the next generation of language learners—with the additional
constraint that performance on the sequence learning task had
to be maintained at the level reached at the end of the first
part of the simulation (to capture the fact that humans are still
superior sequence learners today). Cultural evolution of language
was simulated by having the networks learn several different
languages at each generation and then selecting the best learnt
language as the basis for the next generation. The best learnt
language was then varied slightly by changing the directions of
a rule to produce a set of related “offspring” languages for each
generation.
Although the simulations started with language being
completely flexible, and thus without any reliable word order
constraints, after <100 generations of cultural evolution, the
resulting language had adopted consistent word order constraints
in all but one of the six rules. When comparing the networks
from the first generation at which language was introduced
TABLE 1 | The grammar skeleton used by Reali and Christiansen (2009).
S → {NP VP}
NP → {N (PP)}
PP → {adp NP}
VP → {V (NP) (PP)}
NP → {N PossP}
PossP → {NP poss}
S, sentence; NP, noun phrase; VP, verb phrase; PP, adpositional phrase; PossP,
possessive phrase; N, noun; V, verb; adp, adposition; poss, possessive marker. Curly
brackets indicate that the order of constituents can be as is, the reverse, or either way with
equal probability (i.e., flexible word order). Parentheses indicate an optional constituent.
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and the final generation, Reali and Christiansen (2009) found
no difference in linguistic performance. In contrast, when
comparing network performance on the initial (all-flexible)
language vs. the final language, a very large difference in
learnability was observed. Together, these two analyses suggest
that it was the cultural evolution of language, rather than
biological evolution of better learners, that allowed language to
become more easily learned and more structurally consistent
across these simulations. More generally, the simulation results
provide an existence proof that recursive structure can emerge in
natural language by way of cultural evolution in the absence of
language-specific constraints.
Sequence Learning and Recursive Consistency
An important remaining question is whether human learners are
sensitive to the kind of sequence learning constraints revealed
by Reali and Christiansen’s (2009) simulated process of cultural
evolution. A key result of these simulations was that the sequence
learning constraints embedded in the SRNs tend to favor what
we will refer to as recursive consistency (Christiansen and Devlin,
1997). Consider rewrite rules (2) and (3) from Table 1:
NP → {N (PP)}
PP → {adp NP}
Together, these two skeleton rules form a recursive rule set
because each calls the other. Ignoring the flexible version of these
two rules, we get the four possible recursive rule sets shown in
Table 2. Using these rules sets we can generate the complex noun
phrases seen in (3)–(6):
(3) [NP buildings [PP from [NP cities [PP with [NP smog]]]]]
(4) [NP [PP [NP [PP [NP smog] with] cities] from] buildings]
(5) [NP buildings [PP [NP cities [PP [NP smog] with]] from]]
(6) [NP [PP from [NP [PP with [NP smog]] cities]] buildings]
The first two rules sets from Table 2 generate recursively
consistent structures that are either right-branching (as in 3)
or left-branching (as in 4). The prepositions and postpositions,
respectively, are always in close proximity to their noun
complements, making it easier for a sequence learner to discover
their relationship. In contrast, the final two rule sets generate
recursively inconsistent structures, involving center-embeddings:
all nouns are either stacked up before all the postpositions (5)
or after all the prepositions (6). In both cases, the learner has
to work out that from and cities together form a prepositional
phrase, despite being separated from each other by another
prepositional phrase involving with and smog. This process is
further complicated by an increase in memory load caused by
the intervening prepositional phrase. From a sequence learning
perspective, it should therefore be easier to acquire the recursively
consistent structure found in (3) and (4) compared with the
recursively inconsistent structure in (5) and (6). Indeed, all the
simulation runs in Reali and Christiansen (2009) resulted in
languages in which both recursive rule sets were consistent.
Christiansen and Devlin (1997) had previously shown that
SRNs perform better on recursively consistent structure (such
as those in 3 and 4). However, if human language has adapted
by way of cultural evolution to avoid recursive inconsistencies
(such as 5 and 6), then we should expect people to be
better at learning recursively consistent artificial languages than
recursively inconsistent ones. Reeder (2004), following initial
work by Christiansen (2000), tested this prediction by exposing
participants to one of two artificial languages, generated by
the artificial grammars shown in Table 3. Notice that the
consistent grammar instantiates a left-branching grammar from
the grammar skeleton used by Reali and Christiansen (2009),
involving two recursively consistent rule sets (rules 2–3 and 5–
6). The inconsistent grammar differs only in the direction of two
rules (3 and 5), which are right-branching, whereas the other
three rules are left-branching. The languages were instantiated
using 10 spoken non-words to generate the sentences to which
the participants were exposed. Participants in the two language
conditions would see sequences of the exact same lexical items,
only differing in their order of occurrence as dictated by the
respective grammar (e.g., consistent: jux vot hep vot meep nib
vs. inconsistent: jux meep hep vot vot nib). After training, the
participants were presented with a new set of sequences, one by
one, for which they were asked to judge whether or not these
new items were generated by the same rules as the ones they saw
previously. Half of the new items incorporated subtle violations
of the sequence ordering (e.g., grammatical: cav hep vot lummeep
nib vs. ungrammatical: cav hep vot rud meep nib, where rud is
ungrammatical in this position).
The results of this artificial language learning experiment
showed that the consistent language was learned significantly
better (61.0% correct classification) than the inconsistent one
(52.7%). It is important to note that because the consistent
grammar was left-branching (and thus more like languages such
as Japanese and Hindi), knowledge of English cannot explain
the results. Indeed, if anything, the two right-branching rules in
the inconsistent grammar bring that language closer to English3.
To further demonstrate that the preferences for consistently
recursive sequences is a domain-general bias, Reeder (2004)
3We further note that the SRN simulations by Christiansen and Devlin (1997)
showed a similar pattern, suggesting that a general linguistic capacity is not
required to explain these results. Rather, the results would appear to arise from
the distributional patterns inherent to the two different artificial grammars.
TABLE 2 | Recursive rule sets.
Right-branching Left-branching Mixed Mixed
NP → N (PP) NP → (PP) N NP → N (PP) NP → (PP) N
PP → prep NP PP → NP post PP → NP post PP → prep NP
NP, noun phrase; PP, adpositional phrase; prep, preposition; post, postposition; N, noun. Parentheses indicate an optional constituent.
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TABLE 3 | The grammars used Christiansen (2000) and Reeder (2004).
Consistent grammar Inconsistent grammar
S → NP VP S → NP VP
NP → (PP) N NP → (PP) N
PP → NP post PP → prep NP
VP → (PP) (NP) V VP → (PP) (NP) V
NP → (PossP) N NP → (PossP) N
PossP → NP poss PossP → poss NP
S, sentence; NP, noun phrase; VP, verb phrase; PP, adpositional phrase; PossP,
possessive phrase; N, noun; V, verb; post, postposition; prep, preposition; poss,
possessive marker. Parentheses indicate an optional constituent.
conducted a second experiment, in which the sequences were
instantiated using black abstract shapes that cannot easily be
verbalized. The results of the second study closely replicated
those of the first, suggesting that there may be general sequence
learning biases that favor recursively consistent structures,
as predicted by Reali and Christiansen’s (2009) evolutionary
simulations.
The question remains, though, whether such sequence
learning biases can drive cultural evolution of language in
humans. That is, can sequence-learning constraints promote
the emergence of language-like structure when amplified by
processes of cultural evolution? To answer this question, Cornish
et al. (under review) conducted an iterated sequence learning
experiment, modeled on previous human iterated learning
studies involving miniature language input (Kirby et al., 2008).
Participants were asked to participate in a memory experiment,
in which they were presented with 15 consonant strings. Each
string was presented briefly on a computer screen after which
the participants typed it in. After multiple repetitions of the
15 strings, the participants were asked to recall all of them.
They were requested to continue recalling items until they had
provided 15 unique strings. The recalled 15 strings were then
recoded in terms of their specific letters to avoid trivial biases
such as the location of letters on the computer keyboard and
the presence of potential acronyms (e.g., X might be replaced
throughout by T, T by M, etc.). The resulting set of 15 strings
(which kept the same underlying structure as before recoding)
was then provided as training strings for the next participant.
A total of 10 participants were run within each “evolutionary”
chain.
The initial set of strings used for the first participant in
each chain was created so as to have minimal distributional
structure (all consonant pairs, or bigrams, had a frequency
of 1 or 2). Because recalling 15 arbitrary strings is close to
impossible given normal memory constraints, it was expected
that many of the recalled items would be strongly affected
by sequence learning biases. The results showed that as these
sequence biases became amplified across generations of learners,
the sequences gained more and more distributional structure (as
measured by the relative frequency of repeated two- and three-
letter units). Importantly, the emerging system of sequences
became more learnable. Initially, participants could only recall
about 4 of the 15 strings correctly but by the final generation
this had doubled, allowing participants to recall more than half
the strings. Importantly, this increase in learnability did not
evolve at the cost of string length: there was no decrease across
generations. Instead, the sequences became easy to learn and
recall because they formed a system, allowing subsequences to
be reused productively. Using network analyses (see Baronchelli
et al., 2013b, for a review), Cornish et al. demonstrated that
the way in which this productivity was implemented strongly
mirrored that observed for child-directed speech.
The results from Cornish et al. (under review) suggest
that sequence learning constraints, as those explored in the
simulations by Reali and Christiansen (2009) and demonstrated
by Reeder (2004), can give rise to language-like distributional
regularities that facilitate learning. This supports our hypothesis
that sequential learning constraints, amplified by cultural
transmission, could have shaped language into what we see
today, including its limited use of embedded recursive structure.
Next, we shall extend this approach to show how the same
sequence learning constraints that we hypothesized to have
shaped important aspects of the cultural evolution of recursive
structures also can help explain specific patterns in the processing
of complex recursive constructions.
A Usage-based Account of Complex Recursive
Structure
So far, we have discussed converging evidence supporting the
theory that language in important ways relies on evolutionarily
prior neural mechanisms for sequence learning. But can a
domain-general sequence learning device capture the ability of
humans to process the kind of complex recursive structures that
has been argued to require powerful grammar formalisms (e.g.,
Chomsky, 1956; Shieber, 1985; Stabler, 2009; Jäger and Rogers,
2012)? From our usage-based perspective, the answer does not
necessarily require the postulation of recursive mechanisms as
long as the proposed mechanisms can deal with the level of
complex recursive structure that humans can actually process.
In other words, what needs to be accounted for is the empirical
evidence regarding human processing of complex recursive
structures, and not theoretical presuppositions about recursion as
a stipulated property of our language system.
Christiansen and MacDonald (2009) conducted a set of
computational simulations to determine whether a sequence-
learning device such as the SRN would be able to capture
human processing performance on complex recursive structures.
Building on prior work by Christiansen and Chater (1999),
they focused on the processing of sentences with center-
embedded and cross-dependency structures. These two types
of recursive constructions produce multiple overlapping non-
adjacent dependencies, as illustrated in Figure 1, resulting
in rapidly increasing processing difficulty as the number of
embeddings grows. We have already discussed earlier how
performance on center-embedded constructions breaks down
at two levels of embedding (e.g., Wang, 1970; Hamilton and
Deese, 1971; Blaubergs and Braine, 1974; Hakes et al., 1976). The
processing of cross-dependencies, which exist in Swiss-German
and Dutch, has received less attention, but the available data
also point to a decline in performance with increased levels
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Center-Embedded Recursion in German 
 
 (dass) Ingrid Hans schwimmen sah (dass) Ingrid Peter Hans schwimmen lassen sah 
 
 
 
 (that)  Ingrid  Hans     swim       saw (that)   Ingrid  Peter Hans       swim       let    saw 
 
 Gloss: That Ingrid saw Hans swim Gloss: that Ingrid saw Peter let Hans swim 
 
 
Cross-Dependency Recursion in Dutch 
 
 (dat) Ingrid Hans zag zwemmen (dat) Ingrid Peter Hans zag laten zwemmen 
 
 
 
 (that) Ingrid Hans saw   swim (that) Ingrid Peter Hans saw let       swim 
 
 Gloss: that Ingrid saw Hans swim Gloss: that Ingrid saw Peter let Hans swim 
 
 
FIGURE 1 | Examples of complex recursive structures with one and two levels of embedding: Center-embeddings in German (top panel) and
cross-dependencies in Dutch (bottom panel). The lines indicate noun-verb dependencies.
TABLE 4 | The grammars used by Christiansen and MacDonald (2009).
Rules common to both grammars
S → NP VP
NP → N |NP PP |N and NP |N rel |PossP N
PP → prep N (PP)
relsub → who VP
PossP → (PossP) N poss
VP → Vi |Vt NP |Vo (NP) |Vc that S
Center-embedding grammar Cross-dependency grammar
relobj → who NP Vt|o Scd → N1 N2 V1(t|o) V2(i)
Scd → N1 N2 N V1(t|o) V2(t|o)
Scd → N1 N2 N3 V1(t|o) V2(t|o) V3(i)
Scd → N1 N2 N3 N V1(t|o) V2(t|o) V 3(t|o)
S, sentence; NP, noun phrase; PP, prepositional phrase; PossP, possessive phrase; rel,
relative clauses (subscripts, sub and obj, indicate subject/object relative clause); VP, verb
phrase; N, noun; V, verb; prep, preposition; poss, possessive marker. For brevity, NP
rules have been compressed into a single rule, using “|” to indicate exclusive options.
The subscripts i, t, o, and c denote intransitive, transitive, optionally transitive, and
clausal verbs, respectively. Subscript numbers indicate noun-verb dependency relations.
Parentheses indicate an optional constituent.
of embedding (Bach et al., 1986; Dickey and Vonk, 1997).
Christiansen and MacDonald trained networks on sentences
derived from one of the two grammars shown in Table 4.
Both grammars contained a common set of recursive structures:
right-branching recursive structure in the form of prepositional
modifications of noun phrases, noun phrase conjunctions,
subject relative clauses, and sentential complements; left-
branching recursive structure in the form of prenominal
possessives. The grammars furthermore had three additional
verb argument structures (transitive, optionally transitive, and
intransitive) and incorporated agreement between subject nouns
and verbs. As illustrated by Table 4, the only difference between
the two grammars was in the type of complex recursive structure
they contained: center-embedding vs. cross-dependency.
The grammars could generate a variety of sentences, with
varying degree of syntactic complexity, from simple transitive
sentences (such as 7) to more complex sentences involving
different kinds of recursive structure (such as 8 and 9).
(7) John kisses Mary.
(8) Mary knows that John’s boys’ cats see mice.
(9) Mary who loves John thinks that men say that girls chase
boys.
The generation of sentences was further restricted by
probabilistic constraints on the complexity and depth of
recursion. Following training on either grammar, the networks
performed well on a variety of recursive sentence structures,
demonstrating that the SRNs were able to acquire complex
grammatical regularities (see also Christiansen, 1994)4. The
4All simulations were replicated multiple times (including with variations in
network architecture and corpus composition), yielding qualitatively similar
results.
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networks acquired sophisticated abilities for generalizing across
constituents in line with usage-based approaches to constituent
structure (e.g., Beckner and Bybee, 2009; see also Christiansen
and Chater, 1994). Differences between networks were observed,
though, on their processing of the complex recursive structure
permitted by the two grammars.
To model human data on the processing of center-embedding
and cross-dependency structures, Christiansen and MacDonald
(2009) relied on a study conducted by Bach et al. (1986) in
which sentences with two center-embeddings in German were
found to be significantly harder to process than comparable
sentences with two cross-dependencies in Dutch. Bach et al.
asked native Dutch speakers to rate the comprehensibility
of Dutch sentences involving varying depths of recursive
structure in the form of cross-dependency constructions
and corresponding right-branching paraphrase sentences with
similar meaning. Native speakers of German were tested
using similar materials in German, where center-embedded
constructions replaced the cross-dependency constructions. To
remove potential effects of processing difficulty due to length,
the ratings from the right-branching paraphrase sentences were
subtracted from the complex recursive sentences. Figure 2
shows the results of the Bach et al. study on the left-hand
side.
SRN performance was scored in terms of Grammatical
Prediction Error (GPE; Christiansen and Chater, 1999), which
measures the network’s ability to make grammatically correct
predictions for each upcoming word in a sentence, given prior
context. The right-hand side of Figure 2 shows the mean
sentence GPE scores, averaged across 10 novel sentences.
Both humans and SRNs show similar qualitative patterns
of processing difficulty (see also Christiansen and Chater,
1999). At a single level of embedding, there is no difference
in processing difficulty. However, at two levels of embedding,
cross-dependency structures (in Dutch) are processed more
easily than comparable center-embedded structures (in
German).
Bounded Recursive Structure
Christiansen and MacDonald (2009) demonstrated that a
sequence learner such as the SRN is able to mirror the differential
human performance on center-embedded and cross-dependency
recursive structures. Notably, the networks were able to capture
human performance without the complex external memory
devices (such as a stack of stacks; Joshi, 1990) or external memory
constraints (Gibson, 1998) required by previous accounts. The
SRNs ability to mimic human performance likely derives from a
combination of intrinsic architectural constraints (Christiansen
and Chater, 1999) and the distributional properties of the input
to which it has been exposed (MacDonald and Christiansen,
2002; see also Christiansen and Chater, Forthcoming 2016).
Christiansen and Chater (1999) analyzed the hidden unit
representations of the SRN—its internal state—before and
after training on recursive constructions and found that these
networks have an architectural bias toward local dependencies,
corresponding to those found in right-branching recursion.
To process multiple instances of such recursive constructions,
however, the SRN needs exposure to the relevant types of
recursive structures. This exposure is particularly important
when the network has to process center-embedded constructions
because the network must overcome its architectural bias toward
local dependencies. Thus, recursion is not a built-in property
of the SRN; instead, the networks develop their human-like
abilities for processing recursive constructions through repeated
exposure to the relevant structures in the input.
As noted earlier, this usage-based approach to recursion differs
from many previous processing accounts, in which unbounded
recursion is implemented as part of the representation of
linguistic knowledge (typically in the form of a rule-based
grammar). Of course, this means that systems of the latter
kind can process complex recursive constructions, such as
center-embeddings, beyond human capabilities. Since Miller
and Chomsky (1963), the solution to this mismatch has
been to impose extrinsic memory limitations exclusively
aimed at capturing human performance limitations on doubly
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FIGURE 2 | Human performance (from Bach et al., 1986) on center-embedded constructions in German and cross-dependency constructions in Dutch
with one or two levels of embedding (left). SRN performance on similar complex recursive structures (from Christiansen and MacDonald, 2009) (right).
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center-embedded constructions (e.g., Kimball, 1973; Marcus,
1980; Church, 1982; Just and Carpenter, 1992; Stabler, 1994;
Gibson and Thomas, 1996; Gibson, 1998; see Lewis et al., 2006,
for a review).
To further investigate the nature of the SRN’s intrinsic
constraints on the processing of multiple center-embedded
constructions, Christiansen and MacDonald (2009) explored a
previous result from Christiansen and Chater (1999) showing
that SRNs found ungrammatical versions of doubly center-
embedded sentences with a missing verb more acceptable than
their grammatical counterparts5 (for similar SRN results, see
Engelmann and Vasishth, 2009). A previous oﬄine rating study
by Gibson and Thomas (1999) found that when the middle verb
phrase (was cleaning every week) was removed from (10), the
resulting ungrammatical sentence in (11) was rated no worse
than the grammatical version in (10).
(10) The apartment that the maid who the service had sent over
was cleaning every week was well decorated.
(11) ∗The apartment that the maid who the service had sent over
was well decorated.
However, when Christiansen and MacDonald tested the SRN
on similar doubly center-embedded constructions, they obtained
predictions for (11) to be rated better than (10). To test these
predictions, they elicited on-line human ratings for the stimuli
from the Gibson and Thomas study using a variation of the
“stop making sense” sentence-judgment paradigm (Boland et al.,
1990, 1995; Boland, 1997). Participants read a sentence, word-by-
word, while at each step they decided whether the sentence was
grammatical or not. Following the presentation of each sentence,
participants rated it on a 7-point scale according to how good
it seemed to them as a grammatical sentence of English (with 1
indicating that the sentence was “perfectly good English” and 7
indicating that it was “really bad English”). As predicted by the
SRN, participants rated ungrammatical sentences such as (11) as
better than their grammatical counterpart exemplified in (10).
The original stimuli from the Gibson and Thomas (1999)
study had certain shortcomings that could have affected the
outcome of the online rating experiment. Firstly, there were
substantial length differences between the ungrammatical and
grammatical versions of a given sentence. Secondly, the sentences
incorporated semantic biases making it easier to line up a subject
noun with its respective verb (e.g., apartment–decorated, service–
sent over in 10). To control for these potential confounds,
Christiansen and MacDonald (2009) replicated the experiment
using semantically-neutral stimuli controlled for length (adapted
from Stolz, 1967), as illustrated by (12) and (13).
(12) The chef who the waiter who the busboy offended
appreciated admired the musicians.
(13) ∗The chef who the waiter who the busboy offended
frequently admired the musicians.
5Importantly, Christiansen and Chater (1999) demonstrated that this prediction
is primarily due to intrinsic architectural limitations on the processing on
doubly center-embedded material rather than insufficient experience with these
constructions. Moreover, they further showed that the intrinsic constraints on
center-embedding are independent of the size of the hidden unit layer.
The second online rating experiment yielded the same results
as the first, thus replicating the “missing verb” effect. These
results have subsequently been confirmed by online ratings in
French (Gimenes et al., 2009) and a combination of self-paced
reading and eye-tracking experiments in English (Vasishth et al.,
2010). However, evidence from German (Vasishth et al., 2010)
and Dutch (Frank et al., in press) indicates that speakers of
these languages do not show the missing verb effect but instead
find the grammatical versions easier to process. Because verb-
final constructions are common in German and Dutch, requiring
the listener to track dependency relations over a relatively long
distance, substantial prior experience with these constructions
likely has resulted in language-specific processing improvements
(see also Engelmann and Vasishth, 2009; Frank et al., in press,
for similar perspectives). Nonetheless, in some cases the missing
verb effect may appear even in German, under conditions
of high processing load (Trotzke et al., 2013). Together, the
results from the SRN simulations and human experimentation
support our hypothesis that the processing of center-embedded
structures are best explained from a usage-based perspective
that emphasizes processing experience with the specific statistical
properties of individual languages. Importantly, as we shall see
next, such linguistic experience interacts with sequence learning
constraints.
Sequence Learning Limitations Mirror
Constraints on Complex Recursive Structure
Previous studies have suggested that the processing of singly
embedded relative clauses are determined by linguistic
experience, mediated by sequence learning skills (e.g., Wells
et al., 2009; Misyak et al., 2010; see Christiansen and Chater,
Forthcoming 2016, for discussion). Can our limited ability
to process multiple complex recursive embeddings similarly
be shown to reflect constraints on sequence learning? The
embedding of multiple complex recursive structures—whether
in the form of center-embeddings or cross-dependencies—
results in several pairs of overlapping non-adjacent dependencies
(as illustrated by Figure 1). Importantly, the SRN simulation
results reported above suggest that a sequence learner might
also be able to deal with the increased difficulty associated with
multiple, overlapping non-adjacent dependencies.
Dealing appropriately with multiple non-adjacent
dependencies may be one of the key defining characteristics
of human language. Indeed, when a group of generativists
and cognitive linguists recently met to determine what is
special about human language (Tallerman et al., 2009), one of
the few things they could agree about was that long-distance
dependencies constitute one of the hallmarks of human language,
and not recursion (contra Hauser et al., 2002). de Vries et al.
(2012) used a variation of the AGL-SRT task (Misyak et al.,
2010) to determine whether the limitations on processing of
multiple non-adjacent dependencies might depend on general
constraints on human sequence learning, instead of being
unique to language. This task incorporates the structured,
probabilistic input of artificial grammar learning (AGL; e.g.,
Reber, 1967) within a modified two-choice serial reaction-time
(SRT; Nissen and Bullemer, 1987) layout. In the de Vries et al.
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study, participants used the computer mouse to select one of
two written words (a target and a foil) presented on the screen
as quickly as possible, given auditory input. Stimuli consisted
of sequences with two or three non-adjacent dependencies,
ordered either using center-embeddings or cross-dependencies.
The dependencies were instantiated using a set of dependency
pairs that were matched for vowel sounds: ba-la, yo-no, mi-di,
and wu-tu. Examples of each of the four types of stimuli are
presented in (14–17), where the subscript numbering indicates
dependency relationships.
(14) ba1 wu2 tu2 la1
(15) ba1 wu2 la1 tu2
(16) ba1 wu2 yo3 no3 tu2 la1
(17) ba1 wu2 yo3 la1 tu2 no3
Thus, (14) and (16) implement center-embedded recursive
structure and (15) and (17) involve cross-dependencies.
Participants would only be exposed to one of the four types of
stimuli. To determine the potential effect of linguistic experience
on the processing of complex recursive sequence structure, study
participants were either native speakers of German (which has
center-embedding but not cross-dependencies) or Dutch (which
has cross-dependencies). Participants were only exposed to one
kind of stimulus, e.g., doubly center-embedded sequences as in
(16) in a fully crossed design (length × embedding × native
language).
de Vries et al. (2012) first evaluated learning by administering
a block of ungrammatical sequences in which the learned
dependencies were violated. As expected, the ungrammatical
block produced a similar pattern of response slow-down for both
for both center-embedded and cross-dependency items involving
two non-adjacent dependencies (similar to what Bach et al., 1986,
Bach et al., found in the natural language case). However, an
analog of the missing verb effect was observed for the center-
embedded sequences with three non-adjacencies but not for the
comparable cross-dependency items. Indeed, an incorrect middle
element in the center-embedded sequences (e.g., where tu is
replaced by la in 16) did not elicit any slow-down at all, indicating
that participants were not sensitive to violations at this position.
Sequence learning was further assessed using a prediction
task at the end of the experiment (after a recovery block of
grammatical sequences). In this task, participants would hear
a beep replacing one of the elements in the second half of
the sequence and were asked to simply click on the written
word that they thought had been replaced. Participants exposed
to the sequences incorporating two dependencies, performed
reasonably well on this task, with no difference between center-
embedded and cross-dependency stimuli. However, as for the
response times, a missing verb effect was observed for the
center-embedded sequences with three non-adjacencies. When
the middle dependent element was replaced by a beep in
center-embedded sequences (e.g., ba1 wu2 yo3 no3 <beep> la1),
participants were more likely to click on the foil (e.g., la) than
the target (tu). This was not observed for the corresponding
cross-dependency stimuli, once more mirroring the Bach et al.
(1986) psycholinguistic results that multiple cross-dependencies
are easier to process than multiple center-embeddings.
Contrary to psycholinguistic studies of German (Vasishth
et al., 2010) and Dutch (Frank et al., in press), de Vries et al.
(2012) found an analog of the missing verb effect in speakers
of both languages. Because the sequence-learning task involved
non-sense syllables, rather than real words, it may not have
tapped into the statistical regularities that play a key role in real-
life language processing6. Instead, the results reveal fundamental
limitations on the learning and processing of complex recursively
structured sequences. However, these limitations may be
mitigated to some degree, given sufficient exposure to the
“right” patterns of linguistic structure—including statistical
regularities involving morphological and semantic cues—and
thus lessening sequence processing constraints that would
otherwise result in the missing verb effect for doubly center-
embedded constructions. Whereas the statistics of German
and Dutch appear to support such amelioration of language
processing, the statistical make-up of linguistic patterning in
English and French apparently does not. This is consistent
with the findings of Frank et al. (in press), demonstrating
that native Dutch and German speakers show a missing verb
effect when processing English (as a second language), even
though they do not show this effect in their native language
(except under extreme processing load, Trotzke et al., 2013).
Together, this pattern of results suggests that the constraints
on human processing of multiple long-distance dependencies
in recursive constructions stem from limitations on sequence
learning interacting with linguistic experience.
Summary
In this extended case study, we argued that our ability to process
of recursive structure does not rely on recursion as a property
of the grammar, but instead emerges gradually by piggybacking
on top of domain-general sequence learning abilities. Evidence
from genetics, comparative work on non-human primates,
and cognitive neuroscience suggests that humans have evolved
complex sequence learning skills, which were subsequently
pressed into service to accommodate language. Constraints on
sequence learning therefore have played an important role in
shaping the cultural evolution of linguistic structure, including
our limited abilities for processing recursive structure. We have
shown how this perspective can account for the degree to which
humans are able to process complex recursive structure in the
form of center-embeddings and cross-dependencies. Processing
limitations on recursive structure derive from constraints on
sequence learning, modulated by our individual native language
experience.
We have taken the first steps toward an evolutionarily-
informed usage-based account of recursion, where our recursive
6de Vries et al. (2012) did observe a nontrivial effect of language exposure:
German speakers were faster at responding to center-embedded sequences with
two non-adjacencies than to the corresponding cross-dependency stimuli. No
such difference was found for the Germans learning the sequences with three
nonadjacent dependencies, nor did the Dutch participants show any response-
time differences across any of the sequence types. Given that center-embedded
constructions with two dependencies are much more frequent than with three
dependencies (see Karlsson, 2007, for a review), this pattern of differences may
reflect the German participants’ prior linguistic experience with center-embedded,
verb-final constructions.
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abilities are acquired piecemeal, construction by construction,
in line with developmental evidence. This perspective highlights
the key role of language experience in explaining cross-linguistic
similarities and dissimilarities in the ability to process different
types of recursive structure. And although, we have focused
on the important role of sequence learning in explaining the
limitations of human recursive abilities, we want to stress that
language processing, of course, includes other domain-general
factors. Whereas distributional information clearly provides
important input to language acquisition and processing, it is not
sufficient, but must be complemented by numerous other sources
of information, from phonological and prosodic cues to semantic
and discourse information (e.g., Christiansen and Chater, 2008,
Forthcoming 2016). Thus, our account is far from complete but
it does offer the promise of a usage-based perspective of recursion
based on evolutionary considerations.
Language without a Language Faculty
In this paper, we have argued that there are theoretical reasons to
suppose that special-purpose biological machinery for language
can be ruled out on evolutionary grounds. A possible counter-
move adopted by the minimalist approach to language is to
suggest that the faculty of language is very minimal and only
consists of recursion (e.g., Hauser et al., 2002; Chomsky, 2010).
However, we have shown that capturing human performance on
recursive constructions does not require an innate mechanism
for recursion. Instead, we have suggested that the variation in
processing of recursive structures as can be observed across
individuals, development and languages is best explained by
domain-general abilities for sequence learning and processing
interacting with linguistic experience. But, if this is right, it
becomes crucial to provide explanations for the puzzling aspects
of language that were previously used to support the case for
a rich innate language faculty: (1) the poverty of the stimulus,
(2) the eccentricity of language, (3) language universals, (4)
the source of linguistic regularities, and (5) the uniqueness of
human language. In the remainder of the paper, we therefore
address each of these five challenges, in turn, suggesting how they
may be accounted for without recourse to anything more than
domain-general constraints.
The Poverty of the Stimulus and the Possibility of
Language Acquisition
One traditional motivation for postulating an innate language
faculty is the assertion that there is insufficient information in the
child’s linguistic environment for reliable language acquisition
to be possible (Chomsky, 1980). If the language faculty has
been pared back to consist only of a putative mechanism for
recursion, then this motivation no longer applies—the complex
patterns in language which have been thought to pose challenges
of learnability concern highly specific properties of language (e.g.,
concerning binding constraints), which are not resolved merely
by supplying the learner with a mechanism for recursion.
But recent work provides a positive account of how the child
can acquire language, in the absence of an innate language faculty,
whether minimal or not. One line of research has shown, using
computational results from language corpora and mathematical
analysis, that learning methods are much more powerful than
had previously been assumed (e.g., Manning and Schütze, 1999;
Klein and Manning, 2004; Chater and Vitányi, 2007; Hsu et al.,
2011, 2013; Chater et al., 2015). But more importantly, viewing
language as a culturally evolving system, shaped by the selectional
pressures from language learners, explains why language and
languages learners fit together so closely. In short, the remarkable
phenomenon of language acquisition from a noisy and partial
linguistic input arises from a close fit between the structure of
language and the structure of the language learner. However, the
origin of this fit is not that the learner has somehow acquired a
special-purpose language faculty embodying universal properties
of human languages, but, instead, because language has been
subject to powerful pressures of cultural evolution to match, as
well as possible, the learning and processing mechanism of its
speakers (e.g., as suggested by Reali and Christiansen’s, 2009,
simulations). In short, the brain is not shaped for language;
language is shaped by the brain (Christiansen and Chater, 2008).
Language acquisition can overcome the challenges of the
poverty of the stimulus without recourse to an innate language
faculty, in light both of new results on learnability, and the insight
that language has been shaped through processes of cultural
evolution to be as learnable as possible.
The Eccentricity of Language
Fodor (1983) argue that the generalizations found in language
are so different from those evident in other cognitive domains,
that they can only be subserved by highly specialized cognitive
mechanisms. But the cultural evolutionary perspective that we
have outlined here suggests, instead, that the generalizations
observed in language are not so eccentric after all: they
arise, instead, from a wide variety of cognitive, cultural, and
communicative constraints (e.g., as exemplified by our extended
case study of recursion). The interplay of these constraints,
and the contingencies of many thousands of years of cultural
evolution, is likely to have resulted in the apparently baﬄing
complexity of natural languages.
Universal Properties of Language
Another popular motivation for proposing an innate language
faculty is to explain putatively universal properties across
all human languages. Such universals can be explained as
consequences of the innate language faculty—and variation
between languages has often been viewed as relatively superficial,
and perhaps as being determined by the flipping of a rather small
number of discrete “switches,” which differentiate English, Hopi
and Japanese (e.g., Lightfoot, 1991; Baker, 2001; Yang, 2002).
By contrast, we see “universals” as products of the interaction
between constraints deriving from the way our thought processes
work, from perceptuo-motor factors, from cognitive limitations
on learning and processing, and from pragmatic sources. This
view implies that most universals are unlikely to be found
across all languages; rather, “universals” are more akin to
statistical trends tied to patterns of language use. Consequently,
specific universals fall on a continuum, ranging from being
attested to only in some languages to being found across most
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languages. An example of the former is the class of implicational
universals, such as that verb-final languages tend to have
postpositions (Dryer, 1992), whereas the presence of nouns and
verbs (minimally as typological prototypes; Croft, 2001) in most,
though perhaps not all (Evans and Levinson, 2009), languages is
an example of the latter.
Individual languages, on our account, are seen as evolving
under the pressures from multiple constraints deriving from the
brain, as well as cultural-historical factors (including language
contact and sociolinguistic influences), resulting over time in the
breathtaking linguistic diversity that characterize the about 6–
8000 currently existing languages (see also Dediu et al., 2013).
Languages variously employ tones, clicks, or manual signs to
signal differences in meaning; some languages appear to lack the
noun-verb distinction (e.g., Straits Salish), whereas others have
a proliferation of fine-grained syntactic categories (e.g., Tzeltal);
and some languages do without morphology (e.g., Mandarin),
while others pack a whole sentence into a single word (e.g.,
Cayuga). Cross-linguistically recurring patterns do emerge due
to similarity in constraints and culture/history, but such patterns
should be expected to be probabilistic tendencies, not the rigid
properties of a universal grammar (Christiansen and Chater,
2008). From this perspective it seems unlikely that the world’s
languages will fit within a single parameterized framework (e.g.,
Baker, 2001), and more likely that languages will provide a
diverse, and somewhat unruly, set of solutions to a hugely
complex problem of multiple constraint satisfaction, as appears
consistent with research on language typology (Comrie, 1989;
Evans and Levinson, 2009; Evans, 2013). Thus, we construe
recurring patterns of language along the lines of Wittgenstein’s
(1953) notion of “family resemblance”: although there may be
similarities between pairs of individual languages, there is no
single set of features common to all.
Where do Linguistic Regularities Come From?
Even if the traditional conception of language universals is too
strict, the challenge remains: in the absence of a language faculty,
how can we explain why language is orderly at all? How is it
that the processing of myriads of different constructions have not
created a chaotic mass of conflicting conventions, but a highly, if
partially, structured system linking form and meaning?
The spontaneous creation of tracks in a forest provides an
interesting analogy (Christiansen and Chater, in press). Each
time an animal navigates through the forest, it is concerned only
with reaching its immediate destination as easily as possible. But
the cumulative effect of such navigating episodes, in breaking
down vegetation and gradually creating a network of paths, is
by no means chaotic. Indeed, over time, we may expect the
pattern of tracks to become increasingly ordered: kinks will be
become straightened; paths between ecological salient locations
(e.g., sources of food, shelter or water) will become more strongly
established; and so on. We might similarly suspect that language
will become increasingly ordered over long periods of cultural
evolution.
We should anticipate that such order should emerge because
the cognitive system does not merely learn lists of lexical items
and constructions by rote; it generalizes from past cases to new
cases. To the extent that the language is a disordered morass
of competing and inconsistent regularities, it will be difficult
to process and difficult to learn. Thus, the cultural evolution
of language, both within individuals and across generations of
learners, will impose a strong selection pressure on individual
lexical items and constructions to align with each other. Just
as stable and orderly forest tracks emerge from the initially
arbitrary wanderings of the forest fauna, so an orderly language
may emerge from what may, perhaps, have been the rather
limited, arbitrary and inconsistent communicative system of
early “proto-language.” In particular, for example, the need to
convey an unlimited number of messages will lead to a drive
to recombine linguistic elements is systematic ways, yielding
increasingly “compositional” semantics, in which the meaning
of a message is associated with the meaning of its parts, and
the way in which they are composed together (e.g., Kirby, 1999,
2000).
Uniquely Human?
There appears to be a qualitative difference between
communicative systems employed by non-human animals,
and human natural language: one possible explanation is that
humans, alone, possess an innate faculty for language. But
human “exceptionalism” is evident in many domains, not just in
language; and, we suggest, there is good reason to suppose that
what makes humans special concerns aspect of our cognitive
and social behavior, which evolved prior to the emergence
of language, but made possible the collective construction
of natural languages through long processes of cultural
evolution.
A wide range of possible cognitive precursors for language
have been proposed. For example, human sequence processing
abilities for complex patterns, described above, appear
significantly to outstrip processing abilities of non-human
animals (e.g., Conway and Christiansen, 2001). Human
articulatory machinery may be better suited to spoken language
than that of other apes (e.g., Lieberman, 1968). And the human
abilities to understand the minds of others (e.g., Call and
Tomasello, 2008) and to share attention (e.g., Knoblich et al.,
2011) and to engage in joint actions (e.g., Bratman, 2014), may
all be important precursors for language.
Note, though, that from the present perspective, language
is continuous with other aspects of culture—and almost all
aspects of human culture, from music and art to religious
ritual and belief, moral norms, ideologies, financial institutions,
organizations, and political structures are uniquely human. It
seems likely that such complex cultural forms arise through
long periods of cultural innovation and diffusion, and that the
nature of such propagation depends will depend on a multitude
of historical, sociological, and, most likely, a host of cognitive
factors (e.g., Tomasello, 2009; Richerson and Christiansen, 2013).
Moreover, we should expect that different aspects of cultural
evolution, including the evolution of language, will be highly
interdependent. In the light of these considerations, once the
presupposition that language is sui generis and rooted in a
genetically-specified language faculty is abandoned, there seems
little reason to suppose that there will be a clear-cut answer
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concerning the key cognitive precursors for human language,
any more than we should expect to be able to enumerate the
precursors of cookery, dancing, or agriculture.
Language as Culture, Not Biology
Prior to the seismic upheavals created by the inception
of generative grammar, language was generally viewed as a
paradigmatic, and indeed especially central, element of human
culture. But the meta-theory of the generative approach was
taken to suggest a very different viewpoint: that language is
primarily a biological, rather than a cultural, phenomenon: the
knowledge of the language was seen not as embedded in a culture
of speakers and hearers, but primarily in a genetically-specified
language faculty.
We suggest that, in light of the lack of a plausible evolutionary
origin for the language faculty, and a re-evaluation of the
evidence for even the most minimal element of such a faculty, the
mechanism of recursion, it is time to return to viewing language
as a cultural, and not a biological, phenomenon. Nonetheless,
we stress that, like other aspects of culture, language will have
been shaped by human processing and learning biases. Thus,
understanding the structure, acquisition, processing, and cultural
evolution of natural language requires unpicking how language
has been shaped by the biological and cognitive properties of the
human brain.
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